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Abstract 
Until recently, researchers have typically followed an indirect approach to decomposing 
income inequality into its ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ components, by examining income mobility.  
This study contributes to the existing literature by demonstrating the advantages of 
employing a direct approach, through measuring inequality of opportunities. Based on recent 
Australian data, we estimate that at least 19% of total income inequality before government 
transfers and taxes and at least 17% of total income inequality after government transfers and 
taxes is attributable to factors outside of people’s control. The results also show that Australia 
has a higher share of inequality of opportunities relative to other Western countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent studies show that socio-economic inequalities have been steadily 
increasing in many countries (Piketty 2013; Corak 2013). Growing inequality is 
considered one of the world’s biggest problems today for various reasons. Firstly, 
when the least affluent do not have equal chances to improve their living standards as 
the more affluent members of society then vicious cycles of disadvantage are 
perpetrated (Martinez 2015).  Secondly, increasing inequalities make some segments 
of the populace feel left out, which in turn can diminish social cohesion and increase 
the risk of social conflict (Martinez et al. 2014). To encourage societies to identify 
effective policy responses for the widening gap between the rich and the poor, 
reducing inequality has been elevated as a central theme on the international 
development policy agenda as outlined in the post-2015 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDG) (UN 2014). The growing concern about increasing inequalities calls for 
a greater effort in measuring various indicators of inequality and tracking their 
progress in both local and international space.  
Nowadays, many people readily associate inequality with a social ill that 
societies have to reduce. In Australia, the 2013 Pew Global Attitudes Survey (PGAS) 
suggests that the wider public has generally negative sentiment about inequality. In 
particular, about 64% of Australians believe that inequality has increased in recent 
years and 72% think that this issue could be considered as a problem that needs to be 
addressed (Pew Research Center, 2013). Although the majority of the public may 
think that everything about inequality is problematic, theorists of social justice have 
long argued that inequality has both fair and unfair components (Cohen 1989; Roemer 
1996 & 1998; Bowles, Gintis & Goves 2005). Fair inequality emerges as a result of 
meritocratic societies rewarding people who are skilled and work harder while unfair 
inequality is driven by differences in the lottery of birth where the choices available to 
people are already constrained by the circumstances that they were born into. In the 
economic literature, the former, fair kind is called inequality of outcomes, while the 
latter, unfair type is known as inequality of opportunities. 
Conventional measures of inequality, such as total income inequality, do not 
differentiate between inequality of outcomes and inequality of opportunities and 
hence cannot provide guidance for public policies directed at promoting mobility and 
fairness in a society. Since the 1990s, several advances have been made in gauging 
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the fairness of inequality based on empirical data. The existing literature currently 
offers two analytical approaches, which we label as indirect and direct methods in this 
study.  
The indirect method uses socio-economic mobility, the process of moving up or 
down the socioeconomic ladder over time, as a yardstick of societies’ fairness. In fair 
societies, mobility tends to be high because all individuals have similar chances of 
improving, keeping or worsening their socio-economic status, whereas, in unfair 
societies mobility tends to be low because socio-economic origins are reproduced 
over time. Under the indirect approach, high levels of inequality are assumed to be 
acceptable if they are accompanied by high levels of socio-economic mobility. 
However, from a methodological perspective, the indirect approach has several 
limitations. First, measuring mobility requires either longitudinal data or retrospective 
information on family background that are not always available. Second, even when 
information about family background is available, mobility may not be a good proxy 
for the degree of fairness in a society, as other factors, such as the degree of maturity 
of the economy or transitory income fluctuations, might increase socio-economic 
mobility without necessarily preserving a fair and meritocratic system. The direct 
method, on the other hand, employs specific econometric tools to decompose total 
inequality into the portion that can be explained by socio-economic origins and the 
one that can be explained by effort.  
This paper uses such a direct approach to modelling fairness of income 
inequality. It examines what proportion of total income inequality in Australia can be 
considered fair, resulting from people’s own efforts, and what proportion of it is 
unfair, stemming from different opportunity sets available to people and depending on 
factors out of their control. For simplicity, we measure inequality in terms of income. 
Although contemporary public discussion progressively addresses the multi-faceted 
nature of inequalities, income remains a key component in inequality research 
because it is the main measure of resource access and allows standardised 
comparisons across different cohorts of people, and different countries. Australia is an 
important case in the context of recent income inequality trends. While many 
Australians enjoy a strong egalitarian society with moderate levels of income 
inequality and high income mobility rates, income inequality has grown over time and 
will likely continue to increase in the coming years (Wilkins 2014). Although income 
inequality in Australia remains lower than in the US and UK, it is higher than 
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OECD’s average and translates into substantial differences between those at the top 
and those at the bottom (ACOSS 2015). However, it is not clear to what extent this 
pattern is driven by persistent and growing socio-economic disadvantages as opposed 
to the variations in effort that is embedded in earnings.  
We contribute to the literature on socio-economic inequality and mobility by 
decomposing income inequality into its fair and unfair components, in a context 
where growing inequality coexists with high levels of mobility.  Previous attempts to 
evaluate the degree of fairness of income inequality in Australia have focused on 
measuring income mobility, which we believe can hide important underlying socio-
economic processes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical 
investigation that attempts to measure the contribution of inequality of opportunities 
to total income inequality in Australia using a direct method. The second contribution 
of the paper is to gauge where Australia stands internationally in terms of inequality 
of opportunities. This can inform policy planning by benchmarking Australia’s 
performance against comparable countries and identifying the models to follow. 
In this paper we measure inequality of opportunities using 13 waves of data on 
individual earnings from the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
(HILDA) Survey. Based on our estimates at least 19% of total income inequality 
before government transfers and taxes and at least 17% of total income inequality 
after government transfers and taxes can be attributed to the unfair component of 
inequality. We also compare our estimates for Australia with existing estimates for 
other countries available from Brunori et al (2013) and conclude that Australia does 
not appear to fare well internationally in terms of inequality of opportunities. We 
interpret this finding as indicating that the country should be more vigilant in 
minimizing unfair types of inequality especially now that Australia confronts a period 
of slower economic growth.  
 
2. Fair and unfair inequality 
Perhaps in contrast with popular perceptions, researchers believe that 
eliminating all types of inequalities is not a pre-requisite for a level playing field in 
contemporary societies. On the contrary, inequality of socio-economic outcomes is 
conceived as a natural feature of societies and achieving absolute equality is not seen 
as a desirable goal (Dworkin 1981; Cohen 1989; Roemer 1998; Bowles et al. 2005; 
4 
 
Ferreira & Gignoux 2011; Cho 2014). The modern theories of social justice provide a 
useful background to understand the conditions under which inequality can be 
considered morally acceptable. According to these views, the way socio-economic 
outcomes are distributed in societies depends on three key elements: circumstances, 
effort and luck (Dworkin 1981; Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989).
1
 The term circumstances 
refers to factors outside of people’s control. For example, parental background 
characteristics fall within this category because nobody can choose their parents 
before birth. A similar logic applies to factors such as gender, race and year of birth, 
which can all be defined as circumstances. Unfair inequality of opportunities is the 
part of total inequality that arises because people of different circumstances have 
access to diverging opportunity sets (Dworkin 1981; Cohen 1989; Roemer 1998; 
Fleurbaey 2008). The term effort refers to factors people can be held responsible for 
(Roemer 1998; Cappelen et al. 2010; Brunori, et al 2013). A good example is the level 
of motivation people put in their work or their education. Fair inequality of outcomes 
is the part of total inequality that is due to harder-working people having access to 
better opportunities, very much in line with the concept of meritocracy. Finally, the 
term luck refers to factors that affect total inequality but that do not fall within neither 
the circumstances nor the effort categories (often referred to as ‘external shocks’ in 
the economic literature).  
These themes resonate strongly in sociological literature. There are various 
mechanisms through which socially generated inequalities can be reproduced and 
eventually lead to durable inequalities (Tilly 1999) that can moderate the effect of 
individual circumstances and effort.  For example, people who have command over 
resources can ‘exploit’ anyone who is outside the group by coordinating their efforts 
so that an outsider will receive economic reward that is disproportionately low 
compared with the value added of his/her economic output. This exploitation can be 
further exacerbated by opportunity hoarding which operates when an advantaged 
group gains access to new resources and tries to monopolize them. From a policy 
perspective, redistributive interventions should aim to minimize exploitation and 
opportunity hoarding by smoothening the distribution of opportunities and 
compensating people who are disadvantaged by uncontrollable circumstances 
(Dworkin 1981; Cohen 1989; Roemer 1998; Fleurbaey 2008).  
                                                          
1 In some literature an outcome may be referred as an ‘advantage’.  An advantage is a socio-economic outcome that everyone can 
be reasonably assumed to value (Roemer 1996; Ferreira & Gignoux 2011). Examples of advantages include income, wealth, 
education, employment and health. 
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However, there is no universal consensus on which factors constitute 
uncontrollable circumstances and which can be classified as effort (Kanbur and 
Wagstaff 2015). In some cases, the distinction is clear cut. For example, any income 
disparities that exist between equally educated white and non-white persons working 
in the same jobs would be fully indefensible. In contrast, the fact that some children 
are more motivated to study harder than others can be a combination of inherited 
preference to work harder and an autonomous decision to do as best as they can 
academically. In such case, it is not straightforward to decompose the impact of 
circumstances and effort on outcomes. Additionally, there are also cases where factors 
that can be considered a product of the parents’ efforts get transmitted as 
circumstances to their children. The legitimacy of intervention in these cases is 
questionable because a person’s willingness to exert effort is often shaped by their 
inherited endowments and the opportunities that come with it (Rawls 1999).
2
  
Notwithstanding the conceptual issues raised above, there is still great interest 
in examining categorical inequalities or what the economists usually refer to as 
between-group inequalities. In particular, empirical research has focused on 
measuring between-group inequalities in terms of race, ethnicity, gender, geography 
and parental background (see, for example, Massey 2008). Many of these studies 
implicitly assume that any inequalities that exist between groups result from 
differences in circumstances while inequalities that exist within groups arise because 
of varying levels of effort. Nevertheless, it is important to note that this approach 
produces a lower bound estimate of unfair inequality because (i) it is impossible to 
observe all factors that can be considered as (uncontrollable) circumstances, and (ii) a 
portion of the within group inequality can still be considered to be driven by 
circumstances. Therefore, the results presented in this study can be interpreted as 
‘best-case scenario’ for policy makers. 
 
3. Inequality of Opportunities as a measure of ‘unfair’ inequalities 
What portion of inequality is a result of differences in circumstances and how 
much of it is fair because it can be explained by variations in effort? To answer this 
question, many studies examine the patterns of socio-economic mobility based on the, 
perhaps misleading, assumption that high levels of socio-economic mobility preserve 
                                                          
2  For a list of other examples of fine-grained distinctions between circumstances and effort, see the work of Kanbur and 
Wagstaff (2015). 
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meritocracy and fairness in societies. Let us illustrate how this approach applies to the 
case of income. In a perfectly fair society, the poor have good chances of becoming 
rich through hard work and it is also possible for the rich to become poor if they do 
not exert enough effort to maintain their economic status. Since each income state is 
permeable to anyone, we can expect to observe high levels of mobility. In contrast, in 
unfair societies poor people have high risks of staying in poverty because their 
opportunity sets are heavily restricted by their financial capabilities while rich people 
are more likely to stay at the top of the income distribution because they have access 
to wider opportunity sets. However, this argument is far from perfect. Firstly, income 
inequality and income mobility are not totally independent outcomes. In fact, a 
number of researchers have found that there exists a statistical (and possibly 
economic) relationship between income inequality and income mobility (Corak, 2013; 
Jerrim & Macmillan, 2014).
3
 If, indeed, there are causal links between income 
inequality and income mobility, then a high level of total inequality is unfair because 
it will be accompanied by low income mobility. Second, even assuming that there is 
no negative causal relationship between income inequality and income mobility, the 
level of income mobility is still not a perfect yardstick of the degree of fairness of 
total income inequality. This is because mature economies might have reached their 
long-run equilibrium and consequently display low levels of mobility. (Martinez 
2015) Analogously, high levels of mobility need not always be associated with fair 
inequality especially when they are mainly driven by large income volatility, a likely 
scenario in many developing countries (Martinez 2015). However, neither case tells 
us anything about fairness. Finally it is not entirely clear what the relationship 
between income mobility and inequality of opportunities looks like.   
An alternative approach in gauging the fairness of inequality is to measure 
inequality of opportunities directly (Cohen 1989; Roemer 1996 & 1998; Bowles, et al. 
2005). There are a number of ways of doing this as evidenced by a growing body of 
literature on the measurement of inequality of opportunities. Roemer and Trannoy 
(2014) and Rodriguez (2011) provide an excellent review of the current 
methodological developments. In this study, we adopt the approach proposed by 
Ferreira & Gignoux (2011) and compare our estimates of inequality of opportunities 
                                                          
3  See for instance, the Great Gatsby Curve. Corak (2013) found a negative linear relationship between income inequality and 
income mobility. In particular, countries will high income inequality tend to have low income mobility while countries with low 
income inequality tend to have high income mobility. The term Gatsby Curve has been popularized by US Economist Paul 
Krugman.  
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in Australia with those of other countries as compiled in Brunori et al. (2013). We 
choose income as our unit of measurement of inequality in socio-economic outcomes 
primarily for sake of comparability.  In the succeeding discussions, we denote income 
as y. As shown in (2), y can be viewed as a function of three factors – 
circumstances(𝐶), effort (𝐸) and luck (𝐿). The total inequality of outcomes can be 
estimated using 𝐼(𝑦)where 𝐼(. ) is an indicator pre-chosen from a wide array of 
inequality measures existing in the literature. Since y is a function of 𝐶, 𝐸 and 𝐿, it 
also follows that 𝐼(𝑦) is a function of these three factors too.  
                                                      𝑦 = 𝑔(𝐶, 𝐸, 𝐿) (2) 
                                                       𝐼(𝑦) = 𝐼(𝑔(𝐶, 𝐸, 𝐿)) (3) 
There are two broad perspectives on measuring inequality of opportunities. The 
ex-ante perspective is based on the compensation principle which states that 
inequalities arising from differences in circumstances should be eliminated (van de 
Gaer 1993). This approach entails partitioning all individuals into groups, wherein 
members of each group share similar circumstances. The ex-post perspective is based 
on the reward principle which states that inequalities arising from variations in effort 
should be considered acceptable (Aaberge et al (2011); Fleurbaey & Peragine 2009; 
Juarez & Soloaga 2014). This approach entails partitioning all individuals into groups, 
wherein members in each group share similar levels of effort. Adopting an ex-post 
perspective as opposed to an ex-ante perspective is more challenging because effort is 
usually unobserved. Thus, there are very few studies that measure ex-post inequality 
of opportunities (Bourguignon et al. 2007). In contrast, there are a number of studies 
available that provide country-level estimates of income inequality of opportunities. 
For instance, recently Brunori et al (2013) have compiled estimates of inequality of 
opportunities for 41 countries based on the ex-ante perspective. Using the estimates 
that they compiled for Europe and US, we are able to compare Australia to other 
Western countries in terms of income inequality fairness.  
 
4. Trends in income inequalities in Australia 
Previous research has produced somewhat mixed findings about the actual level 
of income inequality in Australia, with the differences exacerbated by the varying 
data sources and type of income measures used (Wilkins 2015). Nevertheless, the 
accumulated body of evidence suggest that (post-tax) income inequality in Australia 
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has been on the rise over the past 30 years, at least when measured with the Gini 
coefficient  (e.g., Jonson & Wilkins 2006; Australian Bureau of Statistics 2013; 
Whiteford 2014; SWIID 2015).  
Figure 1 indicates that the Gini coefficient increased from 0.27 in 1980 to 0.33 
in 2012. Although Wilkins (2014) emphasises the fact that the Survey on Income and 
Housing (SIH) data, used to produce these estimates, tend to overstate the growth in 
income inequality, numerous studies based on other data sources have confirmed the 
rising trend in income inequality in Australia (ACOSS 2015; Doiron 2012). 
These trends have not escaped the attention of policy-makers. While Australia 
continues to rank well in many socio-economic indicators relative to other OECD 
countries (OECD 2014a; OECD 2014b), the threat of a slower economic growth, 
particularly in the mining sector, which had been one of the main drivers of growth 
over the past decade, and the widening income inequality have prompted 
policymakers to revisit the country’s long-term growth prospects (OECD 2015).  
 
Figure 1. Inequality of Post-Tax Income in Selected OECD Countries 
 
      Source: Standardized World Income Inequality Database (2015) 
 
While there is a potential for increasing inequality to cause serious adverse 
socio-economic impacts (Fletcher and Guttmann 2013), such as diminishing social 
cohesion and increased risk of social conflict (Robinson 2001), it is not clear from 
available estimates, whether or not the level of fairness of inequality is improving or 
deteriorating. 
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Redistribution through taxes and welfare support systems are conventionally 
perceived to have progressive impact on the income distribution. Australia has one of 
the most targeted welfare support system among OECD countries (Whiteford 2013). 
It is estimated that each dollar that the country spends on welfare reduces income 
inequality by approximately 50% more than any other developed country (Whiteford 
2010 and 2011). However, it is not clear how much of this observed reduction of 
inequality can be considered as efficient in the sense that it reduces the unfair 
component of inequality.  
This study contributes to the growing body of evidence on income distribution 
in Australia by directly decomposing income inequality, measured between 2001 and 
2013 using representative panel survey data, into the fair and unfair components, 
namely the inequality due to effort and inequality due to circumstances. 
 
5. Methods 
5.1 Measuring Inequality of Opportunities 
 As pointed out earlier, there are two approaches for measuring inequality of 
opportunities: the ex-ante which posits that inequalities attributable to differences in 
circumstances should be eliminated (van de Gaer 1993); and the ex-post which argues 
that inequalities should be eliminated among people who exert the same amount of 
effort (Roemer 1993 & 1998; Juarez & Soloaga 2014). Primarily for comparative 
reasons, in this paper we adopt an ex-ante perspective and this section describes how 
inequality of opportunities can be measured using this approach.   
Measuring ex-ante inequality of opportunities requires partitioning the 
population into groups that share similar circumstances. In the literature, each group 
sharing the same circumstances is called a type and membership in each type is 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Mathematically, this can be expressed as:  
 
                                                  Π = (𝑇1, 𝑇2, … , 𝑇𝐾) (3) 
  
where Π is the set of all individuals in the population, 𝑇𝑘 is the set of all individuals 
who belong to the 𝑘𝑡ℎ type and 𝐾is the total number of types. For example, assume 
that we use only two characteristics to describe a population: gender and family 
background, so that individuals can be male (m), female (f) and come from rich (r) or 
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poor (p) families. The population Π can then be partitioned in four mutually exclusive 
types (𝐾 = 4) as follows: poor-male (𝑇𝑝𝑚); rich-male (𝑇𝑟𝑚); poor-female (𝑇𝑝𝑓); rich-
female (𝑇𝑟𝑓).   
Inequality of opportunities arises from differences in the opportunity sets faced 
by individuals across types. Assuming that individuals within each type share the 
same opportunity set 𝑣𝑘 , it follows that there are only K unique values for each 
opportunity set as follows:   
 
                                                  v = (𝑣1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣𝐾) (4) 
 
where v is a vector of the values of opportunity sets available to each of the K types. 
In this paper, for the sake of simplicity and comparability, we focus on a single socio-
economic outcome, income, denoted by (𝑦), hence the values related to the 
opportunity sets are derived based on the values of 𝑦. More specifically, we compute 
the average of 𝑦 in the 𝑘𝑡ℎ type, denoted by ?̅?𝑘, and equate this to the opportunity set 
for the 𝑘𝑡ℎ type, i.e., 𝑣𝑘 = ?̅?𝑘.
4
  Following with our example, this consists of equating 
the 𝐾 = 4 opportunity sets to the average income for each of the corresponding 4 
types such that: 𝑣𝑝𝑚 = ?̅?𝑝𝑚;  𝑣𝑟𝑚 = ?̅?𝑟𝑚;  𝑣𝑝𝑓 = ?̅?𝑝𝑓;  𝑣𝑝𝑚𝑟𝑓 = ?̅?𝑓𝑟. Subsequently, we 
derive a counterfactual distribution for {𝑦𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁} by equating each 𝑦𝑖 to 
𝑣𝑘 ∀ 𝑖 ∈  𝑇𝑘 . This counterfactual distribution, denoted by {?̃?}, assumes that the 
opportunity sets that paved the way to the observed socio-economic outcomes are 
solely determined by individuals’ membership in different categories. Hence, we can 
estimate the (ex-ante) inequality of opportunities by applying a desired inequality 
measure 𝐼(. ), in our case the mean log deviation (MLD), on {?̃?} such that:  
                                                     
                                                  𝐼𝑂𝑃𝑒𝑥−𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 = 𝐼(?̃?) (5) 
 
where ?̃?𝑖𝑘 = 𝑣𝑘.    
Finally, we compute the ratio of inequality of opportunities to the total observed 
inequality, which provides a measure of the extent to which total inequality can be 
attributed to factors outside people’s control, as follows:  
 
                                                          
4 We can also compute the median instead of the average to minimize the impact of outliers.  
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                                                      𝐼𝑂𝑅 =  
I(?̃?)
𝐼(𝑦)
 (6) 
 
The method above follows a non-parametric approach in deriving the 
counterfactual distribution of income when the opportunity sets are solely determined 
by (unfair) circumstances. In this study, we adopt a parametric approach by estimating 
regression models
5
 and assuming a specific functional form to describe the 
relationship between income and circumstances (Marrero and Rodriguez 2011).
6
 The 
main advantage of using the parametric approach is in the fact that it is less sensitive 
to sample size. As a matter of fact, when multiple circumstances are accounted for in 
the model, the non-parametric approach usually requires large samples, to avoid very 
low cell count which is likely to occur when partitioning the population into very 
detailed types. Furthermore, the parametric approach tends to yield lower estimates of 
inequality of opportunities than the parametric method as outlined in many empirical 
applications (Ferreira and Gignoux 2011; Brunori, Ferreira and Peragine 2013). 
Finally, it is the approach adopted in Brunori et al 2013 and we prefer it for 
comparability reasons.  
Technically speaking, the parametric approach entails regressing 𝑦 on the vector 
of circumstantial variables. The obtained predicted values, denoted by ?̂?𝑖,  represent 
the counterfactual distribution which assumes that income differences are solely 
determined by differences in circumstances. The inequality of opportunities and ratio 
of inequality of opportunities to total inequality are obtained respectively from 
equations (5) and (6) by substituting the counterfactual distribution ?̃?𝑖with the 
predicted values ?̂?𝑖. It is important to note that unless we can observe the full set of 
circumstances, (5) and (6) should be considered lower bound estimates for inequality 
of opportunities.
7
 In practice, it is often the case that some circumstances are omitted 
from the estimated models, because, for example, they are unobserved. This causes 
the residuals to be higher and the observed circumstances to account for a smaller 
fraction of total inequality, hence the lower bound estimate.  
  
 
                                                          
5 We also estimated our models using the parametric approach to test the sensitivity of our results. Although the non-parametric 
approach produced slightly higher values of IOR, the results are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained with our preferred 
parametric approach.  
6 We use the IOP program for Stata to implement this approach. IOP is developed by Juarez & Soloaga (2014) and is based on 
the estimation methodology adopted by Ferreira & Gignoux (2011, 2013).   
7 Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) provides a formal proof that IOR is a lower bound estimate of inequality of opportunities.  
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5.2  Data and summary statistics 
 
The analysis is based on data from thirteen annual waves (2001-2013) of the 
Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, an 
Australian longitudinal study that collects social, demographic, economic and 
employment information on all members of sample households aged 15 and over 
(Watson and Wooden 2012). HILDA Survey is an ongoing panel study that started in 
2001. In wave 1, the sample contained almost 20,000 individuals from 7,500 
households who were tracked yearly in the succeeding waves. This dataset is 
especially relevant for our analysis since it provides detailed information on outcomes 
and circumstances of individuals over a relatively long period of time. In this paper, 
we measure outcomes in terms of income and employ various pecuniary measures 
available in HILDA to examine inequality of opportunities in Australia. In particular, 
we use a person’s total annual income which includes regular and irregular income 
from employment, business, private pensions and private transfers. The income 
variable is expressed (i) before government transfers and taxes, (ii) after government 
transfers but before taxes, and (iii) after government transfers and taxes. Comparing 
the three estimates helps us unveil otherwise undetected mechanisms. In particular, 
this approach allows us to gauge the redistributive impact of government transfers and 
taxes in the country.   We prefer individual income over household income for 
methodological reasons
8
 and also to facilitate comparisons with other countries since 
the estimates for Europe and US that are compiled in Brunori et al.’s (2013) work are 
based on individual income.  
All incomes are expressed in real terms using 2013 prices to account for 
inflation. In addition to this, we compute the mean log deviation (MLD) in income by 
taking the average log deviations of individual incomes to the overall mean income. 
We adopt MLD as the main summary measure of inequality following Brunori et al 
(2013) to facilitate comparability in results. The conventional MLD takes a value of 
                                                          
8 Household income and individual income are expected to yield different levels of total inequality according to the empirical 
literature (Nolan, et al. 2011). As a matter of fact, there is more variability/dispersion in labour earnings than in household 
income and this is reflected in total inequality estimations. What is not entirely clear is whether a similar pattern will emerge 
when measuring inequality of opportunities. Household income is a collective measure of all the income sources in each 
household. We anticipate using household income as an outcome measure will underestimate the inequality of opportunities for a 
number of reasons.  First, if a person lives with someone who is significantly more hardworking than average, he/she enjoys a 
higher standard of living as a result of luck and not as a result of circumstances or effort. Second, when pooling household 
members’ incomes together people with different individual characteristics but nested within the same households will be 
assigned the same income. Hence household income can potentially amplify the impact of luck or attenuate the role of 
circumstances, a mechanism that is irrelevant when we use individual (labour) earnings.  
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zero when all incomes are equal while larger positive values of MLD are indicative of 
higher levels of inequality of outcomes.   
Based on data availability and indicators that are commonly used in existing 
studies of inequality of opportunities, we select a number of key variables that define 
circumstances in our estimates of the counterfactual distribution of income. In 
particular, a person’s circumstances are captured by age, gender, race and ethnicity, 
geography and parental background. Age is expressed as a continuous variable. 
Ethnicity is measured based on the person’s country of birth as well as that of his/her 
parents. The data collected are converted as follows: whether the person was born in 
(i) Australia or New Zealand, (ii) US or UK, (iii) other industrialized countries, or (iv) 
other countries. The same categories are used for the parents’ country of birth. On the 
other hand, five categories for Indigenous status are considered, namely, (i) not of 
Indigenous origin, (ii) Aboriginal, (iii) Torres Strait Islander, and (iv) both Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander. To capture spatial disparities in income, we constructed 
eight dummies to represent each Australian state and territory and other five dummies 
that represent quintiles of the Socio-Economic Indexes for Areas (SEIFA) developed 
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) to account for exposure to multi-
dimensional disadvantage.
9
 For parental background, we use the occupational status 
scale based on the Australian Socioeconomic Index 2006 (AUSEI06) which is 
provided in the unit-record files of the HILDA Survey. The values of AUSEI06 range 
from 0 to 100 where low values represent low-status occupations and high values 
represent high-status occupations. We divided the distribution of values of AUSEI06 
into five quintiles and assigned a dummy for each quintile.  
All the succeeding analyses are based on the pooled cross-sectional data of 
individuals aged 25 to 65 years who were either working or actively looking for work 
at each wave. The age restriction is designed to capture the working age population 
who has ideally completed full-time education. We further confine the analyses to all 
individuals who have provided complete information on all income and circumstances 
variables.
10
  Our final estimation sample is a pooled cross-section consisting of 68,812 
person-year records. Finally, cross-sectional individual weights are used in our 
                                                          
9 The SEIFA is a composite index of different measures of socio-economic advantage and disadvantage collected from the 
Census. 
10 We did not make adjustments for missing values. We recognize that our approach may introduce bias in the estimates of 
inequality of opportunities if the incomes of those who provided complete data on all variables are systematically different from 
the income of those who did not give complete information. However, we do not have enough information to infer the direction 
of the bias.  
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estimates to guarantee representativeness of the Australian labour force aged 25 to 65.  
Summary statistics for all variables included in this study are provided in Table 1.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Income (average) Estimate Country of birth (percent) Estimate
Total Income (before transfers and taxes) 77,098.87 Other industrialized countries 2.54
Total Income (after transfers, before taxes) 79,127.83 Other countries 11.7
Total Income (after transfers and taxes) 62,913.99 Aborigin (percent)
Not of indigenous origin 98.69
Age (percent) Aboriginal 1.11
25 to 34 28.2 Torres Strait Islander 0.05
35 to 44 29.32 Both aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 0.01
45 to 54 26.75 Father's country of birth (percent)
55 to 65 15.73 Australia / New Zealand 63.7
Gender (percent) US / UK 12.73
Male 51.59 Other industrialized countries 7.66
Female 48.41 Other countries 15.91
State (percent) Father's occupational status scale (percent)
New South Wales 31.72 0 to 20 9.56
Victoria 25.62 20 to 40 41.93
Queensland 20.39 40 to 60 23.58
South Australia 7.02 60 to 80 11.2
Western Australia 9.67 80 to 100 13.73
Tasmania 2.39 Mother's country of birth (percent)
Northern Territory 0.99 Australia / New Zealand 66.5
Australian Capital Territory 2.19 US / UK 11.93
SEIFA (percent) Other industrialized countries 6.75
Bottom quintile 13.28 Other countries 14.82
Second quintile 17.93 Mother's occupational status scale (percent)
Third quintile 20.25 0 to 20 17.11
Fourth quintile 22.34 20 to 40 35.18
Top quintile 26.19 40 to 60 27.31
Country of birth (percent) 60 to 80 3.9
Australia / New Zealand 78.1 80 to 100 16.5
US / UK 7.66  
16 
 
 
6. Empirical Results 
 
6.1 Overall trends in Income Inequality 
 
Figure 2 shows the estimated average annual real income in Australia from 
2001 to 2013. There is a general upward trend in all types of income considered in 
this study from 2001 to 2013. However, income growth has been significantly lower 
since 2009 and this trend could be partly attributed to the impact of the global 
financial crisis (GFC). Incomes started rising again as the economy recovered from 
GFC between 2011 and 2013, however, the growth is not as fast as what transpired in 
the early 2000s. This may reflect the decline in resource boom which resulted in 
slower economic growth (RBA 2015). 
 
Figure 2. Mean Annual Income using 2013 prices, HILDA: 2001-2013 
 
           Source: Authors’ computations using HILDA Survey.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates total income inequality fluctuations, as measured by total 
income MLD, between 2001 and 2013. Clearly, the level of inequality is highest 
when measured before government transfers and taxes and lowest after incorporating 
government transfers and taxes. On average, inequality is reduced by 22% when 
government transfers are included and it is further reduced by an additional 21% after 
deducting taxes. This finding confirms the redistributive impact of taxes and welfare 
support. In terms of temporal trends, the highest levels of income inequality are 
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generally occurring during periods of rapid economic growth, this is especially 
evident between 2001 and 2002 when the GDP growth was 4% and before the GFC 
between 2004 and 2005 with the GDP growth at 4.5%. Such trend could indicate that 
economic growth has benefited the rich more than the poor. Interestingly, income 
inequality trends in before government transfers and taxes income and net income 
diverge between 2008 and 2010. This pattern is discussed in detail in the concluding 
section of the paper.    
 
Figure 3. Income Inequality Trends (Mean Log Deviation), HILDA: 2001-2013 
 
           Source: Authors’ computations using HILDA Survey.  
 
6.2 How much inequality of opportunities is there in Australia?  
 
We estimate three income equations to obtain the counterfactual income 
distribution necessary to compute our measures of inequality of opportunities. Yearly 
estimates from ordinary least square (OLS) models are reported in Tables 2.1 to 2.3.   
For each survey year, we then regress the three types of incomes on the vector 
of circumstances variables. The model estimates are consistent with our expectations. 
In particular, the results confirm that circumstances have a relatively significant 
impact on income and most of the direction of the estimated effects are consistent 
with the broad economic literature. For instance, the dummy variable for gender 
indicates that men have higher average incomes than women. Interestingly though, 
our results suggest that the gender disparities in income have increased over time, 
especially when individual incomes are examined. There are also some significant 
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income differences in terms of the place of residence. Residents of New South Wales 
and Victoria have significantly higher incomes, compared with other states, while 
those who are from Northern Territory have the lowest incomes. Furthermore, people 
residing in socio-economically advantaged neighbourhoods tend to have higher 
incomes as suggested by the increasingly positive coefficients of the quintiles of the 
SEIFA index. Aboriginal status is predominantly insignificant, probably because there 
are very few Indigenous people in the sample and as well because there are other 
characteristics that are especially predominant in the Indigenous population which we 
are already accounting for such as residing in Northern Territory where most of 
Indigenous people are located or parental occupation and the SEIFA index quintiles. 
The statistical evidence also reveals that country of birth contributes significantly to 
income differences. In particular, those who were born in developing countries have 
significantly lower incomes than people who were born in Australia or other 
industrialized countries. Parental country of birth was generally insignificant, perhaps 
due to its impact already being moderated by the respondent’s country of birth. 
However, the differences in parental occupations still explain a significant portion of 
the observed total income inequality. As expected, people whose parents had 
occupations of a higher status tend to have higher incomes than children of parents 
with lower-status jobs.   
Following the analytical strategy described in Section 5, the counterfactual 
distribution of income is obtained by using the predicted values of each of the 
regression model of income. This counterfactual distribution is then used to calculate 
the level and relative share of inequality of opportunities. Again, it is important to 
note that the set of estimates should be viewed as a lower bound of the total inequality 
of opportunities because we do not have complete information of the circumstances of 
each person.  
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Table 2.1.  OLS Regression of income before gov’t transfers & taxes on circumstances, 2001-2013 
Variables 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Age 458.88*** 469.11*** 701.25*** 581.84*** 719.93*** 659.87*** 507.48*** 303.63*** 422.52*** 538.5*** 637.63*** 613.06*** 706***
Male dummy 29801*** 27366*** 30182*** 30070*** 34707*** 29949*** 31578*** 32811*** 34383*** 33790*** 33132*** 33709*** 32262***
State
New South Wales
Victoria 275.08 284.05 -75.392 -1287.5 -677.83 913.67 2101.7 -3167.9 -960.2 -2011.3 865.66 -2819.5 3670.9
Queensland -4376.7** -5000.7** -9292.8*** -5467.7** -3379.2 -1256 -859.47 -4295 -3103.3 3028.4 3301.5 1131.9 11994***
South Australia -4520.3 -5467.8 -3031.7 -2954.7 4473.4 3094.5 639.67 -636.95 -4662.6 -1109.4 -945.15 1006.6 2664.2
Western Australia -5428.7** -5191.2 -6732.7* -6622.8** -3699.3 -6731.6 3075.1 3106.8 4660.9 5140.8 11258*** 7409.3** 14283***
Tasmania -7930.6 -8505.6 -9954.4 -3021.8 -6907.8 -8274.6 -7133.7 -10832 -7501.5 -387.73 -7491.3 -10067* -2099.1
Northern Territory -12160 -4785.3 -13169 -14087* -15021 -19495* -13422 -4682.2 -34133*** -31765*** 2845.5 -18841** 1399.4
Australian Capital Territory -1972.1 -1896.5 -2793.1 -2351.9 -7615.1 -1398.4 5220 -9835.7 5596 3200 -8901.7 -14412** -5030.3
SEIFA
1st quintile
2nd quintile 440.26 448.8 1984.7 10.723 2475.2 3845.6 3810.3 4191.5 3057.6 1919.6 -1097.3 -1370.7 3092.1
3rd quintile 4555.1* 7155.6** 9543.7*** 7278.5** 8525.8** 10784*** 6861.7* 8868.9** 11419*** 8135.9** 8605.2*** 7526.3** 5767.7*
4th quintile 21195*** 16238*** 18983*** 13577*** 18713*** 20848*** 20212*** 23354*** 21130*** 21506*** 15600*** 15158*** 17763***
5th quintile 27909*** 27468*** 30386*** 27203*** 34508*** 42604*** 39147*** 38224*** 32482*** 36133*** 36112*** 38436*** 39709***
Country of birth
Australia / New Zealand
US / UK 8739.9** 7860.2 4805.3 4243.4 4723.3 9489.3 -4188.4 1106.8 395.46 2546 8699.2* 6739.9 3740.5
Other industrialized countries 11064** 12384* 7078.7 1493.2 1097.2 -6250 -7600.6 7187.5 -6690.8 -12302 -21709*** -15427** -14700**
Other countries -5797.5 -6971.3 -12414** -11057** -7543.6 -22494*** -23476*** -13587** -9670.4* -15326*** -23045*** -14033*** -7876.9*
Aborigin
Not of indigenous origin
Aboriginal -5893.1 -8026.4 -7879.3 -3304.8 -4122.7 -8239.3 -3722.3 333.62 -759.24 -3451.5 -3615 -6856.6 -3511.9
Torres Strait Islander -14028 -21486 -30715 6109.1 11013 -7646.5 -7224.9 1697.2 -9122.5 -16066 -16371
Both aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander -14262 -13066 -14046 -13545 5544.9 19987 18299 14678 7646.3 11219 8804.2 7811.4 10092
Father's country of birth
Australia / New Zealand
US / UK 720.42 3917.8 4723.5 1645.5 -137.17 2542.4 172.89 -897.49 4310.9 1272.5 1290.7 3155.8 -31.939
Other industrialized countries -4378.2 3709.3 1115.3 554.45 923.38 2771.3 14297*** 13120*** 15111*** 12632** 9073.3** 11570*** 11661**
Other countries -948.97 5853.6 1627.7 5879.3 155.28 4550.6 680.85 2506.1 5198.5 4166.8 2565.1 2067.1 4167
Father's occupational status scale
0 to 20
20 to 40 1440.3 1690.5 4557.1 2902.6 5389.7 6561.3* 8176.2** 7624.5** 6685.9* 4453.9 -898.29 4081.8 6516.3*
40 to 60 5060.1* 7942.5** 6816.1* 4720.3 5945.7 5247.7 8843.1** 9663.3** 11094*** 10718*** 3165.3 8677.8** 14007***
60 to 80 13204*** 9778.6** 16427*** 11281*** 15606*** 11488** 18758*** 22316*** 25060*** 20490*** 12805*** 12387*** 17772***
80 to 100 7353.8** 6854.2* 9872.2** 10444*** 14502*** 10651** 15509*** 16244*** 22368*** 18480*** 16308*** 20726*** 22194***
Mother's country of birth
Australia / New Zealand
US / UK 234.12 -4869.8 -5292.5 -3477.5 266.91 -5721.2 550.64 115.53 -3872.3 -1002.6 -2467.5 -117.22 2050.1
Other industrialized countries -800.13 -9518.6* -4452.6 -4137.1 -2098.6 -2705 -13932** -17937*** -9836* -10918** -5660.2 -6965.3 -10815**
Other countries 5053.7 -3697.8 954.41 -3667.7 -272.4 9586.1 11093* 2925.8 -5720.6 5021.8 4305.6 -554.4 -4694.6
Mother's occupational status scale
0 to 20
20 to 40 159.22 -1312.1 -754.35 1149 1453.2 -27.793 -1525.4 -1126.8 2408.2 1110.1 368.14 763.56 959.28
40 to 60 3331.8 4998.9* 6967.5** 4482.1* 5402.3* 7374.4** 3161.7 7040.9** 8054.8** 6771.6** 7517.6** 4264.7 3064
60 to 80 3939.1 4086.5 -1364.1 6301.9 3821 454.35 3654.9 4866.3 813.61 1165 -1801.3 3670.4 6019.4
80 to 100 4682.8* 5070.1 2403.9 1934 -227 449.84 1895.1 2955.7 3624.7 4199.8 7919.2** 4547 5333.8
Intercept 8174.5* 12509** -94.132 8799.7* -4164.9 -995.35 6557.4 13591** 7028.9 4794 6922.9 7724.6 -4072.5
No of observations 5037 4815 4675 4578 4801 4874 4798 4833 5003 5049 6697 6620 6582
Adjusted R
2 
(%) 13.44 9.75 10.65 12.11 11.14 8.80 9.37 11.05 10.96 10.96 10.94 11.52 10.04
Total Inequality in Gross Hhld Income 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.37 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.33
Inequality of Opportunities Ratio (%) 21.08 15.82 20.81 17.15 21.22 21.99 20.86 21.12 19.54 19.73 20.41 20.40 19.27  
Source: Authors’ calculations using HILDA Survey 
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Table 2.2.  Regression of income after gov’t transfers, before taxes on circumstances, 2001-2013 
Variables 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Age 426.56*** 446.56*** 675.02*** 581.84*** 681.33*** 628.98*** 465.74*** 261.42*** 361.19*** 500.5*** 598.52*** 613.06*** 706***
Male dummy 28940*** 26460*** 29369*** 30070*** 33648*** 28989*** 30524*** 31886*** 33304*** 33099*** 32212*** 33709*** 32262***
State
New South Wales
Victoria 408.33 495.69 258.37 -1287.5 -447.69 1191.1 2269.8 -2914.2 -944.63 -2141.9 535.11 -2819.5 3670.9
Queensland -3695.8* -4476.2* -8937.1*** -5467.7** -3499.6 -816.4 -733.07 -4189.8 -3426.4 2956.7 3207.3 1131.9 11994***
South Australia -4060.7 -4736.7 -2761.8 -2954.7 4407.8 3402.2 614.83 -311.86 -4278.5 -1317.4 -935.53 1006.6 2664.2
Western Australia -4863.2* -4759.9 -6109.2* -6622.8** -3657 -6202.3 3634.1 3160.3 4664.3 5285.8 10894*** 7409.3** 14283***
Tasmania -7389.5 -7715.5 -9323 -3021.8 -6547.6 -8157.5 -6989.2 -10930 -7737.9 -677.3 -8132.4 -10067* -2099.1
Northern Territory -11878 -4270.7 -12590 -14087* -14240 -19066* -13390 -3874.7 -32206*** -30729*** 3149.5 -18841** 1399.4
Australian Capital Territory -1806.4 -1787.5 -2170.4 -2351.9 -6842.1 -765.57 5560.7 -9406 5842 3733.6 -8871.6 -14412** -5030.3
SEIFA
1st quintile
2nd quintile 704.65 957.22 2553.7 10.723 2684.3 3789.2 3592.3 4429.9 2940.6 1160.4 -1809.4 -1370.7 3092.1
3rd quintile 3911.1 6584.8** 8969.3*** 7278.5** 7632.8** 9702.8** 5996.7 7969.9** 9999.1*** 6871.5* 7590.6** 7526.3** 5767.7*
4th quintile 20170*** 15389*** 17738*** 13577*** 17134*** 19351*** 18636*** 21773*** 19012*** 19472*** 14190*** 15158*** 17763***
5th quintile 26446*** 26114*** 28687*** 27203*** 32367*** 40343*** 36957*** 36264*** 29739*** 33728*** 33974*** 38436*** 39709***
Country of birth
Australia / New Zealand
US / UK 8383.2** 7375.5 3875.5 4243.4 4580.9 8566.1 -4595.1 492.32 -345 2147.6 8711.1* 6739.9 3740.5
Other industrialized countries 10185* 11077* 7073.3 1493.2 309.05 -7401 -9025.2 5434.8 -8005.1 -13455* -22348*** -15427** -14700**
Other countries -5605.6 -6838.7 -12378** -11057** -7673.9 -22129*** -23366*** -13606** -9722.7* -15318*** -23079*** -14033*** -7876.9*
Aborigin
Not of indigenous origin
Aboriginal -4889.6 -6915.3 -7166.7 -3304.8 -4242 -7309.7 -2290.9 2394.9 3064.1 -1030.1 -1768.4 -6856.6 -3511.9
Torres Strait Islander -8609 -17525 -26549 2891.4 6876 -5957.3 -9584.6 -159.23 -7030.7 -16066 -16371
Both aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander -12980 -12792 -11511 -13545 3464.2 17127 16691 13851 11449 12895 13348 7811.4 10092
Father's country of birth
Australia / New Zealand
US / UK 371.91 3876.2 4533.8 1645.5 -96.2 2989.4 405.48 -827.54 4615 1422.3 1253.2 3155.8 -31.939
Other industrialized countries -3482.2 4535.7 1649.9 554.45 1314.8 3383.5 14513*** 13191*** 15200*** 12758*** 9427.7** 11570*** 11661**
Other countries -1175 5683.7 1349.9 5879.3 -33.282 4674.4 578.13 2429.9 5450.4 4089.2 2542.3 2067.1 4167
Father's occupational status scale
0 to 20
20 to 40 1685.9 1995 4990.3 2902.6 5275.5 6832.3* 7660.6** 7176.5** 6223.5* 3540.1 -1076.3 4081.8 6516.3*
40 to 60 5213.8* 8006.5** 7371.8** 4720.3 5632.8 5557.8 8433.4** 9488.9** 10881*** 10111** 2988.6 8677.8** 14007***
60 to 80 13054*** 9766.3** 17071*** 11281*** 15743*** 11722** 18077*** 21528*** 24692*** 19840*** 12634*** 12387*** 17772***
80 to 100 7402.1** 6825* 10239** 10444*** 14147*** 10729** 15007*** 15714*** 21821*** 17663*** 15914*** 20726*** 22194***
Mother's country of birth
Australia / New Zealand
US / UK 878.46 -4298.2 -4624.3 -3477.5 126.09 -5655 549.82 591.76 -4031.7 -1195.8 -2400.4 -117.22 2050.1
Other industrialized countries -913.51 -9123.9* -4142.4 -4137.1 -1997.1 -2398 -13001** -16198*** -9260.5* -10621** -5615 -6965.3 -10815**
Other countries 5133.1 -3790.9 896.18 -3667.7 136.93 9204.4 11373* 3351 -6027.3 4708.1 4041.3 -554.4 -4694.6
Mother's occupational status scale
0 to 20
20 to 40 195.34 -1365.3 -1164.1 1149 1224.3 -202.57 -1392.7 -1155.4 1860.1 618.38 1.8652 763.56 959.28
40 to 60 3080.3 5017.5* 6651.2** 4482.1* 5318.2* 7233.5** 3293.2 6735.7** 7540.2** 6214.9* 7121.6** 4264.7 3064
60 to 80 4066.5 4514.8 -1790.6 6301.9 3773.1 0.73446 3737 4575.2 18.25 280.19 -2120.9 3670.4 6019.4
80 to 100 4600.4* 5005.3 2164.4 1934 -254.94 278.9 1774.1 2508.5 2803.5 3521.3 7269.2** 4547 5333.8
Intercept 12006** 15935*** 3627.7 8799.7* 1446.1 3779.3 12380* 19358*** 16168** 11510* 12911** 7724.6 -4072.5
No of observations 5037 4815 4675 4578 4801 4874 4798 4833 5003 5049 6697 6620 6582
Adjusted R
2 
(%) 12.64 9.10 10.05 12.11 10.45 8.20 8.76 10.37 10.25 10.44 10.44 11.52 10.04
Total Inequality in Gross Hhld Income 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
Inequality of Opportunities Ratio (%) 23.20 17.70 22.83 19.25 24.01 23.69 22.57 22.76 21.55 21.37 22.00 21.40 20.33  
Source: Authors’ calculations using HILDA Survey 
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Table 2.3.  Regression of income after gov’t transfers & taxes on circumstances, 2001-2013 
Variables 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Age 271.06*** 304.56*** 445.69*** 394.59*** 432.36*** 471.57*** 313.53*** 183*** 280.67*** 415.93*** 485.41*** 613.06*** 706***
Male dummy 18592*** 16984*** 18448*** 18471*** 22326*** 19260*** 20500*** 20948*** 22354*** 22594*** 21932*** 33709*** 32262***
State
New South Wales
Victoria 109.69 290.78 195.39 -1066.6 241.2 222.71 1791.7 -1854.3 -620.23 -1897.9 754.5 -2819.5 3670.9
Queensland -2150.8 -2930.8* -6120.4*** -3346.8** -1589.4 -675.89 -478.95 -2655.2 -2596.4 1765.2 1528.8 1131.9 11994***
South Australia -2243.6 -3247.5 -1491.8 -1305.6 4907.9* 2172.1 655.46 75.851 -2860.5 -749.64 -23.123 1006.6 2664.2
Western Australia -2890.6* -3237.9 -4396* -4472** -2399.3 -4996.7 3020.7 1423.5 2859.6 3073.5 7173.9*** 7409.3** 14283***
Tasmania -4584 -4145.9 -6401.7 -672.83 -3728 -6242.6 -4335 -7630.8 -5546.4 -1220.5 -5385.7 -10067* -2099.1
Northern Territory -7187.5 4725.1 -7429.2 -9695.3* -10136 -13945 -7471.1 -2520.4 -22054*** -20956*** 11862* -18841** 1399.4
Australian Capital Territory -1245.5 1333.8 -1982.1 -1614.7 -5430.7 2135 3908.3 -5260.6 9847.8** 8429* -4696.1 -14412** -5030.3
SEIFA
1st quintile
2nd quintile 512.92 751.9 1832.7 343.17 2019.8 2514.3 2176.6 3407.8 1917.3 838.75 -1406.2 -1370.7 3092.1
3rd quintile 2210 4159.7** 5884*** 3761.7* 4649.2* 6551.1** 3871.6 5490.8** 6313.7*** 4913.8** 5414** 7526.3** 5767.7*
4th quintile 12810*** 10107*** 12069*** 7524.8*** 11351*** 13038*** 12668*** 14556*** 12616*** 13252*** 9322.5*** 15158*** 17763***
5th quintile 16421*** 16603*** 18567*** 16058*** 21621*** 27347*** 23941*** 24683*** 19621*** 22379*** 22812*** 38436*** 39709***
Country of birth
Australia / New Zealand
US / UK 4578.7* 4322.9 2886.9 3062.3 4845.4 6283.8 -3508.5 333.79 -743.39 1903.2 6327.5* 6739.9 3740.5
Other industrialized countries 5894.1* 7239.3* 4632.8 598.7 -712.37 -5270.5 -7117.5 6099.3 -6005.1 -8053.5 -14367*** -15427** -14700**
Other countries -4475.3* -2786.3 -8535.7** -7485.9** -4416 -16770*** -16169*** -10220*** -7237.3** -11764*** -16397*** -14033*** -7876.9*
Aborigin
Not of indigenous origin
Aboriginal -3182.3 -4972.6 -4905.5 -2410.1 -3248.3 -5286.1 -1102.9 2903.7 2902.9 -845.05 -1367 -6856.6 -3511.9
Torres Strait Islander -6024.1 -10306 -21237 466.01 3833.9 -5269 -6803.5 -47.497 -3879.3 -16066 -16371
Both aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander -6500 -7328.2 -8195.7 -7821.9 1845.2 11063 11126 9701.9 8290.5 8763.2 9412.8 7811.4 10092
Father's country of birth
Australia / New Zealand
US / UK 354.13 3974.6 2503.7 966.73 -39.949 2317.1 603.68 -818.38 3368.5 1218.1 968.14 3155.8 -31.939
Other industrialized countries -2261.4 2752.2 499.68 102.16 68.016 3768.6 8506.5** 4431.3 8578.6*** 6754.3** 4918.4 11570*** 11661**
Other countries -1054.3 4250 546.2 3677.5 -399.48 5525 1588.2 690.42 2755.3 1654 2193.7 2067.1 4167
Father's occupational status scale
0 to 20
20 to 40 3055.7* 4930.5** 4410.5* 3287.2 4275.7 3498 5825.2** 6679.8** 7066.2*** 7274.1*** 1569.9 8677.8** 14007***
40 to 60 8963.2*** 5659** 11334*** 7225.5*** 10084*** 8274.2** 12794*** 14366*** 17202*** 13965*** 7714.5*** 12387*** 17772***
60 to 80 4894.5** 5458.6** 6517** 7645.4*** 10181*** 8213.2** 10650*** 11592*** 14690*** 12800*** 10057*** 20726*** 22194***
80 to 100 1017.9 -3362 -3452.5 -2386 -768.43 -4969.3 -224.99 87.217 -3536.5 -1224.1 -1825.9 -117.22 2050.1
Mother's country of birth
Australia / New Zealand
US / UK 1017.9 -3362 -3452.5 -2386 -768.43 -4969.3 -224.99 87.217 -3536.5 -1224.1 -1825.9 -117.22 2050.1
Other industrialized countries -92.903 -5624.2* -2800.4 -2435.8 -1278.1 -2563.3 -7726.5** -8941.6** -5633.7 -6862.9* -4036.9 -6965.3 -10815**
Other countries 3767.1 -4630 311.41 -2649.1 -233.67 4696.5 6408.4 3352.2 -3760.5 4862.4 2417.6 -554.4 -4694.6
Mother's occupational status scale
0 to 20
20 to 40 195.07 -642.64 -423.8 805.97 1117.7 229.36 -1174.6 -770.24 1479.5 355.01 462.72 763.56 959.28
40 to 60 1970.4 3272.1* 4527.1** 3112.3* 3589.8* 5305** 1956 4027.2* 5805.4*** 4598.9** 5349.7** 4264.7 3064
60 to 80 3072.6 4086.9 -1415.2 4756.5 3539.1 1390.1 2216.8 2677.9 239.99 -85.283 -1546.9 3670.4 6019.4
80 to 100 2891.3* 3408.7 1187.8 2199.9 -332.76 1544.9 1241.4 2820.1 2331.9 2287.5 4924.6** 4547 5333.8
Intercept 15800*** 17833*** 10348** 15073*** 8450.4* 7840.5 17000*** 21364*** 19536*** 14093*** 15466*** 7724.6 -4072.5
No of observations 5037 4815 4675 4578 4801 4874 4798 4833 5003 5049 6697 6620 6582
Adjusted R
2 
(%) 13.53 8.46 8.80 10.27 9.83 7.00 8.94 9.30 10.17 10.31 10.19 11.52 10.04
Total Inequality in Gross Hhld Income 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.21
Inequality of Opportunities Ratio (%) 20.30 15.65 19.35 16.79 21.80 22.07 20.05 19.52 19.28 19.16 19.29 19.18 17.44  
Source: Authors’ calculations using HILDA Survey
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Figure 4. Inequality of opportunities, HILDA: 2001-2013 
 
          Source: Authors’ computations using HILDA Survey. 
 
Figure 5. Share of inequality of opportunities  
to total inequality over time (%), HILDA: 2001-2013 
  
          Source: Authors’ computations using HILDA Survey. 
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Figure 4 presents the time trend in the estimated level of inequality of 
opportunities between 2001 and 2013. Similar to the patterns observed for the total 
income inequality, there are sharp fluctuations in the first half of the observation 
period. The level of inequality of opportunities peaked in 2005 and subsequently 
dropped until the GFC. Then we observe a raising trend in the inequality of 
opportunities after the GFC hit in 2008, which persists until 2011. However, most 
recent data suggests that inequality of opportunities is following a downward path 
again.  
Interestingly, the impact of government transfers on inequality of opportunities 
is less remarkable when we compare it with how much welfare support from 
government reduces total income inequality.  On average, government transfers have 
reduced the level of inequality of opportunities by 15%, in contrast to the 22% 
reduction in total inequality.  On the other hand, we observe a stronger inequality-
reducing impact from taxes. Specifically, taxes reduce the inequality of opportunities 
measured by gross incomes by about 31%.  
Is the share of inequality of opportunities to total income inequality changing 
over time? To answer this question, we plot the annual estimates of IOR for each type 
of income in Figure 5. Again, we find significant fluctuations from 2001 to 2005 
when the values of IOR ranged from 15% to 23%. Since 2005, our estimated IORs 
have followed a general downward trend. In 2013, the share of inequality of 
opportunities to total income inequality is 19% for income measured before 
government transfers and taxes, 20% for pre-tax gross income and 17% for post-tax 
income. Interestingly, the estimated shares of inequality of opportunities with respect 
to the first and last types of income are approximately the same until 2007 but then 
diverge afterwards. On the other hand, the share of inequality of opportunities is 
always highest when using pre-tax gross income.  
To identify which factor contributes the most to driving the disparities in socio-
economic opportunities, we decompose the estimated inequality of opportunities into 
the relative contribution of each circumstance variable. To accomplish this, we follow 
the decomposition method outlined in Ferreira and Gignoux (2011).
11
 Figure 6 plots 
                                                          
11  This approach is based on the standard Shapley inequality decomposition method.  This method can be readily implemented 
using the IOP Stata module developed by Juarez and Soloaga (2014).  
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the individual share of each circumstance variable using the full estimation sample. 
We  
 
Figure 6. Contribution of Individual Circumstances (%), HILDA: 2001-2013 
 
    Source: Authors’ computations using HILDA Survey. 
 
Figure 7. Contribution of Individual Circumstances (%), HILDA: 2001-2013 
(Individuals that work for at least 40 hours per week) 
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  Source: Authors’ computations using HILDA Survey. 
 
find that gender is the single most important circumstantial characteristic – the 
disparities  between  men  and  women  account  for  about 40 per cent of the 
observed inequality of opportunities. A further 30 per cent can be explained by spatial 
inequalities (i.e. SEIFA + state). Parental occupation accounts for one-tenth of the 
‘unfair’ inequality of opportunities while 5% can be attributed to race and ethnicity. 
The contribution of each variable is consistent across the three types of income. 
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Figure 8. Share of Inequality of Opportunities to Total Inequality (%) 
 
 
Source:  The estimates for European countries are based on the work of Checchi et al. (2010) who used EU-SILC 2005 while the 
estimate for US is based on the study of Pistolesi (2009) who used PSID 2001. All the estimates are compiled by Brunori et al. 
(2013). 
 
 
Given these findings, is it reasonable to conclude that the story of inequality of 
opportunities in Australia a gendered-tale? Or is this finding just an artefact of using 
total annual income as a basis for calculating inequality? According to Labour Force 
Survey data publicly available on the ABS website  the incidence of part-time work 
for the female labour force is 43% whereas it only amounts to 14% for the male 
labour force a pattern which is likely to distort reality if unaccounted for.   Assuming 
that some of the reasons why women work less than men are freely made decisions, it 
may not be safe to assume that all gender disparities in income that arises from 
differences in the amount of time spent on work should be readily considered as 
inequality of opportunities.  In Figure 7, we re-estimated the contribution of each 
circumstance to inequality of opportunities by restricting the data to all individuals 
who worked at least 40 hours per week only.  This results to a significantly lower 
contribution of gender to ‘unfair’ inequality of opportunities, dropping from 40% to 
17%. 
As a final step of our analysis, we examine how Australia’s inequality of 
opportunities compares with other countries. To situate our estimates for Australia 
internationally, we benchmark them against the estimates compiled by Brunori et al. 
(2013).  To facilitate comparability, we only focus on Western countries with 
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available estimates of (ex-ante) inequality of opportunities. Since all the IOR 
estimates, except for the US, are based on the 2005 wave of the European Union 
Statistics on Income and Living Condition (EU-SILC), we also choose 2005 as the 
reference period for Australia.  Lastly, all estimates are based on post-tax income. 
Figure 8 sorts countries based on IOR from lowest to highest.  The results 
suggest that Australia’s 21.7% is the second highest estimated share of ‘unfair’ 
inequality, just a little behind Ireland’s 22.3%. Other Western countries that posted 
large share of inequality of opportunities include Germany, US, Netherlands, Spain, 
Austria and UK. In contrast, Scandinavian countries have consistently low shares of 
inequality of opportunities.  
 
7. Discussion and Summary 
 
According to the Better Life Initiative Report published in 2014, Australia is 
performing well in many domains, such as education, jobs, income and health, which 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has identified 
to be essential for living a good life (OECD 2014a). Australia is also considered one 
of the most egalitarian nations in the industrialized world due to its high level of 
intergenerational mobility (Huang, Perales & Western). Having high intergenerational 
mobility implies that Australians born in poor families will have better chances of 
moving up the socio-economic ladder than most of their counterparts from other rich 
countries like the US and the UK. Stable economic growth, high wages and low 
unemployment are often considered as the main foundations of an egalitarian regime 
(Whiteford 2014). However, the recent decline in the resource boom and a slower 
economic growth are threatening future prosperity of the country. Furthermore, the 
trends in inequality suggest that the gap between Australia’s rich and poor has 
widened over the past three decades (SWIID 2015). These developments are of a 
major concern for academics and policy makers alike because the increasing 
inequality could trap today’s poor in a vicious cycle of disadvantage. 
This study re-examines the income inequality trends in Australia from 2001 to 
2013 by decomposing inequality into its fair and unfair components. Our results based 
on the HILDA Survey suggest that inequality of individual incomes among the 
working population has increased during episodes of strong economic growth as well 
as the period following the Global Financial Crisis. However, our estimates also 
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suggest that government transfers and taxes have helped taper down the level of 
income inequality.  
Should we be concerned about income inequality in Australia? Yes, and this 
study has identified several reasons why. First, we have demonstrated that factors 
outside of people’s control such as gender, country of birth, parental occupation and 
residential location account for a considerable fraction of the total income inequality. 
This represents inequality of opportunities. From 2001 to 2013, we estimate that the 
share of inequality of opportunities to total inequality ranged from 15% to 22%. Since 
the HILDA Survey does not have complete information about each person’s 
circumstances, this figure should be considered as a lower bound estimate of ex-ante 
inequality of opportunities. Furthermore, our analyses also suggest that high shares of 
inequality of opportunities coincide with episodes of economic expansion particularly 
in 2005, suggesting unequal redistribution of benefits from economic growth.  Finally, 
our results also show that the levels of unfair inequality in Australia are higher than 
what is found in other industrialized countries like the UK and the US. Although the 
share of inequality of opportunities seems to have gone down since 2005, Australia 
still needs to be vigilant in promoting a more equitable distribution of socio-economic 
opportunities as disadvantages of circumstances.  
Australia has one of the most targeted welfare systems among the OECD 
countries. For instance, the country’s bottom quintile was more reliant on government 
transfers than other developed nations’ poor (OECD 2014c). However, statistical 
evidence suggests that taxes contribute to lowering inequality of opportunities, but 
there is mixed evidence on the impact of government transfers. In particular, our 
results suggest that government transfers have weaker impact on reducing inequality 
of opportunities than its capacity to pull total income inequality down. This finding 
calls for the need to re-examine the effectiveness of these systems in reducing unfair 
inequalities. In addition to taxes and welfare support, there are other policy tools that 
can be considered when attempting to minimize inequality of opportunities. These 
policy tools typically fall into one of two types. First are responses that specifically 
target unfair differences in outcomes, such as direct and indirect income 
discrimination on the basis of gender, Indigenous status or country birth. Second are 
attempts to address inequalities of opportunities with respect to “intermediate” 
outcomes that are directly related to welfare outcomes of interest. These include, for 
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example, policies to address unfair (i.e. circumstantial) outcomes in education or 
employment, that become the basis for unfair outcomes in income.   
In summary, the objective of this study was to measure inequality of 
opportunities in Australia. It advances the socio-economic inequality literature in 
Australia by providing empirical estimates of the magnitude of inequality of 
opportunities using a direct approach, in contrast to the indirect approaches used in 
previous studies. Nevertheless, there are areas for improvement and future research 
avenues that are worth pointing out. First, there are emerging criticisms against using 
a lower bound estimate of inequality of opportunities as a policy construct as this can 
undermine the issue of increasing inequality (Kanbur and Wagstaff 2015). In 
particular, using a lower bound estimate of inequality of opportunities may provide an 
impression that bad inequality is low and should not be a source of concern.  Second, 
we estimated inequality of opportunities using the ex-ante perspective only. Future 
studies may consider measuring inequality of opportunities from an ex-post 
perspective to assess the extent to which unequal opportunities are decoupled from 
levels of individual effort. However, this approach presupposes that data on effort is 
available. Furthermore, to be able to further advance research on inequality of 
opportunities, it is important to examine it from a multidimensional perspective. This 
would entail examining inequality of opportunities in terms of a broader set of socio-
economic outcomes that goes beyond income, such as education, health, and 
employment.  
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Appendix  
To show that an increase in income mobility does not always represent more 
equal distribution of economic opportunities, consider the correlation between adults’ 
earnings and their parental earnings (denoted by 𝜌𝐼𝐺) as a measure of 
(intergenerational) income mobility. Furthermore, let us assume that the level of 
inequality of opportunities is known beforehand. As shown in (1), 𝜌𝐼𝐺  can be 
expressed as a function of the variance of adults’ incomes that can be explained by 
parents’ success (denoted by 𝑉(?̂?)) and variance of adults’ incomes that can be 
explained by other factors (denoted by 𝑉(𝑊)). In this case, 𝑉(?̂?) can be considered as 
a measure of inequality of opportunities. If the distribution of adults’ incomes 
becomes increasingly independent of their family background, i.e., 𝑉(?̂?) decreases, 
𝜌𝐼𝐺  will increase only if V(W) decreases too. Otherwise, it is possible for 𝜌𝐼𝐺  to 
decrease even if 𝑉(?̂?) has increased (Jencks and Tach 2006). Thus, it is not safe to 
generalize that income mobility will always increase (decrease) when inequality of 
opportunities decreases (increases).  
                                          𝜌𝐼𝐺 =  
𝑉(?̂?)
𝑉(?̂?)+𝑉(𝑊)
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Appendix Table 1.  Shapley Shares 
Circumstances 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Age 4.56 5.63 9.68 8.19 9.13 7.37 4.06 1.50 2.75 5.05 6.52 6.72 8.08
Gender 48.21 45.59 43.92 52.42 50.88 38.63 42.60 44.57 48.43 45.69 41.56 43.70 40.38
State 3.62 4.35 5.36 3.21 2.11 2.99 2.29 2.71 3.94 2.88 2.94 2.90 3.98
SEIFA 31.22 29.89 27.27 26.08 26.91 38.46 35.44 33.62 25.75 29.93 28.04 31.05 31.22
Country of birth 2.08 2.31 2.23 1.72 1.39 3.96 3.15 1.38 1.07 1.89 5.37 2.76 1.62
Aborigin 0.54 0.58 0.66 0.35 0.55 0.69 0.33 0.48 0.39 0.47 0.37 0.55 0.57
Father's country of birth 0.81 0.95 0.68 0.45 0.51 0.66 1.60 1.17 1.76 0.98 1.57 1.69 1.15
Father's occupational status scale 5.94 6.13 5.53 4.99 5.93 3.66 6.95 9.09 11.89 9.46 8.19 7.35 9.22
Mother's country of birth 0.71 0.75 0.54 0.69 0.58 0.74 1.30 1.39 0.82 0.78 1.33 1.19 1.38
Mother's occupational status scale 2.31 3.82 3.08 1.90 1.94 2.83 2.27 4.09 3.19 2.88 4.11 2.09 2.40
Circumstances 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Age 4.18 5.48 9.65 8.07 8.76 7.10 3.61 1.14 2.13 4.54 6.03 6.25 7.75
Gender 49.46 46.51 45.07 53.70 52.15 39.31 43.26 45.79 49.79 46.94 41.90 44.46 40.94
State 3.30 4.02 5.35 3.11 2.16 2.98 2.45 2.79 4.16 3.02 3.02 2.97 3.95
SEIFA 30.58 29.05 25.94 24.64 25.80 37.80 34.83 32.85 23.89 28.72 27.30 30.20 30.67
Country of birth 2.11 2.31 2.39 1.79 1.45 4.02 3.36 1.34 1.19 2.08 5.86 3.10 1.85
Aborigin 0.39 0.48 0.54 0.30 0.36 0.61 0.28 0.35 0.25 0.33 0.26 0.48 0.42
Father's country of birth 0.79 1.05 0.92 0.48 0.54 0.72 1.58 1.36 2.04 1.02 1.74 1.83 1.25
Father's occupational status scale 6.08 6.25 6.11 5.23 6.14 3.77 7.00 9.13 12.34 9.75 8.40 7.48 9.46
Mother's country of birth 0.80 0.76 0.65 0.67 0.59 0.75 1.29 1.19 0.91 0.78 1.46 1.30 1.48
Mother's occupational status scale 2.31 4.08 3.38 2.01 1.99 2.95 2.33 4.07 3.30 2.82 4.06 1.93 2.23
Circumstances 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Age 4.03 5.85 10.13 9.43 7.92 8.07 3.47 1.20 2.60 6.30 8.33 9.03 10.25
Gender 50.59 44.80 43.24 51.73 52.20 36.68 43.78 44.88 48.39 45.63 40.78 41.59 39.31
State 2.87 4.60 5.72 3.01 2.23 3.40 2.56 2.61 4.94 3.57 3.28 2.72 3.06
SEIFA 29.75 28.72 26.58 23.86 25.97 37.71 34.08 34.05 23.20 27.33 26.56 29.53 30.39
Country of birth 2.10 2.12 2.65 2.15 1.70 4.61 3.60 1.68 1.42 2.25 6.13 3.56 1.94
Aborigin 0.35 0.47 0.54 0.30 0.38 0.60 0.25 0.31 0.23 0.32 0.25 0.50 0.42
Father's country of birth 0.83 1.45 0.91 0.57 0.59 0.94 1.27 0.58 1.65 0.73 1.71 2.05 1.46
Father's occupational status scale 6.34 6.95 6.14 5.65 6.26 4.16 7.55 9.65 12.78 10.07 7.58 7.31 8.63
Mother's country of birth 0.86 0.87 0.76 0.94 0.66 0.85 1.08 0.98 1.06 0.87 1.69 1.80 1.71
Mother's occupational status scale 2.28 4.16 3.33 2.35 2.10 2.97 2.36 4.06 3.72 2.92 3.69 1.90 2.85
Total Income (before transfers and taxes)
Total Income (after transfers, before taxes)
Total Income (after transfers and taxes)
 
